A modest beginning: the new EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership

This commentary was first published by the UK in a Changing Europe.

Professor Richard Whitman analyses the Security and Defence Partnership announced at the UK-EU summit in London on Monday 19 May. He argues that the agreement does not exceed any strategic partnerships that the EU has with other third countries and that it only serves to formalise existing areas of cooperation. He suggests it falls short on its ambition to begin a genuine strategic alliance between the UK and EU on defence and security.

The new Security and Defence Partnership announced between the European Union and the United Kingdom at the Lancaster House summit today is rather underwhelming. Compared to the aspirations set by the current UK government in advance of coming to power for a wide-ranging security pact, or measured against existing EU security and defence agreements with third countries – this partnership cannot be considered a mould-breaking agreement.

The security and defence partnership is presented as a central component of the new Strategic Partnership between the EU and the UK. However, a closer examination of the new framework reveals that it does not exceed existing models the EU already employs with other third countries. The agreement has a preamble which stresses the degree to which the two partners have shared interests and are aligned in their concern with the security order in Europe, as upended by Russia. Although a timetable for meetings at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers and officials to facilitate a more structured dialogue is now proposed – something absent since the agreement on the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) – all of these arrangements could have been introduced much earlier, particularly after the inauguration of President Trump last autumn when heightened coordination became an urgent political concern.

At its core, the agreement is primarily a commitment to dialogue and to explore cooperation across several areas already familiar from other EU third country agreements. It sets the stage for the UK to align with existing forms of EU third country agreements, such as participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency. However, this will require further negotiation. The agreement also mentions a momentum for the currently stalled participation in the EU member states’ security and defence capabilities development PESCO projects. The reference to the latter is somewhat carefully worded (point 8 in the agreement) as the UK’s participation in the project remains stalled due to objections from Spain on the issue of Gibraltar.

The bulk of the Security and Defence Partnership agreement outlines areas of shared concern including space security, disruptive technologies, cyber issues, hybrid threats, critical infrastructure resilience, countering foreign information manipulation, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and others. These are sensible areas for cooperation, as well as the flagged collaboration in multilateral fora like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). The agreement also casts security in a broad light, encompassing economic security, irregular migration, the climate-security nexus, and global health – embracing what might be considered a standard menu of contemporary security topics.

What is notably absent, however, is any substantial section in the text providing for a role for the UK in the EU’s evolving European Defence Industrial Strategy. Although the separately agreed statement on A renewed agenda for European Union – United Kingdom cooperation Common Understanding states that two parties ‘should swiftly explore any possibilities for mutually beneficial enhanced cooperation created by the SAFE instrument’. This is the arrangement for the EU to support the development of Europe’s defence industry and military urgent investments through a €150bn loan for investment in procurement in urgent defence capabilities.

The lack of detail on defence industry collaboration is surprising given the significance of the issue – for the UK as a major defence industry actor, for the EU as part of its political integration project, and, as significantly, for Ukraine, which is central to the rationale for a strengthened European defence posture. Any genuine security and defence strategic partnership would have defence industrial collaboration as a central objective.

When compared to the EU’s more developed agreements with other European states – most notably Norway, which is a member of the European Economic Area, Schengen, and involved in EU efforts to support Ukraine – this EU-UK agreement appears very light weight. Further, Ukraine itself is becoming increasingly embedded in EU defence initiatives, reinforcing the idea that more comprehensive forms of integration are available to key partners.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the Security and Defence Partnership is more about formalising the existing ad hoc cooperation on Ukraine and creating a structure for broader foreign and security collaboration. It does not represent a transformative moment or strategic shift; rather, it formalises a more normalised, codified dialogue between the two parties.

The agreement also falls short given the evolving global strategic context which the separate UK-EU Joint Statement outlines in vivid detail. As the United States re-evaluates its security commitments to Europe, the UK and EU are under increasing pressure to assume greater responsibility for their own defence. The Security and Defence Partnership agreement does not rise to that challenge in its current form. This is not a strategic partnership designed to confront the most pressing order-defining issues in Europe today – particularly how to secure the continent as US guarantees become less certain than at any point since the start of the Cold War.

If the intent of this agreement was to signal the beginning of a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and the UK in security and defence, then it falls short. Rather than creating the basis for a new alliance for security and defence, this agreement reflects a mutual willingness to return to normalised relations. It does not chart a path towards partnering on a robust future European security architecture, which is the key challenge faced by European governments. The EU-UK Agreement is not a game-changer for either partner’s security and defence, but one small part of a modest and cautious rapprochement between the two neighbours.

This commentary was first published by the UK in a Changing Europe.