Afghanistan: UK, EU, and NATO must examine costs and consequences of strategic failures

The Integrated Review, a post-Brexit roadmap for the UK’s foreign, security and defence policy, places considerable stress on the UK as a European power with a heightened ambition for greater prominence beyond Europe, notably in the Indo-Pacific. But the elements of greatest certainty underpinning this appear to be the most unsettled by Afghanistan.

The purpose of the transatlantic security relationship, as encapsulated by NATO bringing Europe and the US together for consensus on shared threats and a vehicle for collective action, is being publicly questioned by some member state governments which are normally more taciturn.

Displaced Afghans from the northern provinces arrive at a makeshift camp in Kabul, Afghanistan as the Taliban takes control of the country. Photo by Paula Bronstein /Getty Images.

NATO looks set for a period of introspection on the nature of its decision-taking and costs of its collective commitments in Afghanistan. As the lynchpin of the UK’s security and defence policy, any NATO pre-occupation is a UK pre-occupation.

Afghanistan has led to a flurry of calls for action by EU leaders, and that the conclusion to be drawn is a greater impetus for the ambition of European strategic autonomy on security and defence. A predominantly Brussels-centred narrative has already taken hold that the US decision to withdraw shows Europe must be able to think and act autonomously, not least as insurance against untrustworthy American political leaders.

For ‘Global Britain’ the best safeguard of a healthy transatlantic security relationship is a wide-ranging, no-holds barred, debate on the costs and consequences for Europe of the fall of Kabul.

Of lesser attention is that the EU has been ostensibly focused on a security and defence policy expressly for the purpose of conflict and crisis management since the 1990s, with the specific objective of being able to undertake humanitarian and rescue tasks – as was required in Kabul – but member states fail to act collectively.

The UK is no longer at the centre of these EU debates, but is significantly impacted by any extra impetus for enhanced or accelerated EU defence plans so it should attempt to broaden the discussion beyond the confines of the EU. It can play a significant role by demonstrating capacity for an open-minded approach, and by using its bilateral relationships and mini-lateral formats – notably the E3 with France and Germany.

The multinational Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) already show that the UK seeks to be a leader rather than a laggard on enhanced European capacity. For ‘Global Britain’ the best safeguard of a healthy transatlantic security relationship is a wide-ranging, no-holds barred, debate on the costs and consequences for Europe of the fall of Kabul.

This post first appeared as part of an Expert Comment for Chatham House.