The European security landscape is now unrecognisable from before Brexit

A willingness to undertake previously unthinkable actions, big increases in defence expenditure, and significant shifts in the security stances of European states means that the landscape of European security is now unrecognisable from when the UK departed the EU. This is on top of the launch of the EU’s first defence industrial strategy, which some EU leaders see as a step towards creating a European defence union.

Looking down the track, there is much uncertainty, with the war in Ukraine ongoing and the prospect of a second Donald Trump Presidency. Does it matter that the UK is a bystander in the EU’s rapidly expanding role in European defence and security?

Britain’s diplomatic and military support for Ukraine has positioned it as one of Europe’s key responders to Russia’s aggression. Although it has pushed the UK and the EU into close coordination – especially on sanctions – it has not led to any major thinking on the part of the EU as to what future partnership might be built with the UK.

As our new UK in a Changing Europe report outlines, the UK is currently unusual among the EU’s major partners in not having any structured coordination on foreign, security, and defence policy as an accompaniment to its trade agreement. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) that currently governs the formal UK-EU relationship provides for very little in the way of cooperation on international issues.

However, since Russia’s war on Ukraine, a pragmatic approach has been taken in EU-UK cooperation in support of Kyiv, with shared interests driving cooperation in the absence of a formal agreement. There has been a particular intensification of ad hoc UK-EU coordination in across sanctions, intelligence exchanges, and the training of the Ukrainian armed forces.

The current UK government has been content for its cooperation with the EU in this area to be informal. David Cameron, the Foreign Secretary, has expressed a preference for ad hoc cooperation with the EU  rather than a more formalised relationship on foreign, security, and defence policy with the EU.

However, this could be seen as somewhat complacent with the EU now setting itself the goal of “mainstreaming a defence readiness culture”. Labour, by contrast, has an ambition to ‘reset’ relations with the EU, with its foreign and defence frontbench team pushing the idea of a new ‘EU-UK security pact’.

As our new report outlines, however, any future government needs to consider the fine details of such an agreement. There are certainly opportunities: establishing dialogues on areas of common concern, or seconding staff to build UK-EU networks. However, unlike establishing more structures for foreign policy coordination, finding common ground on defence cooperation will be more challenging as it involves politically sensitive questions of sovereignty, and the commitment of significant resources.

EU peacekeeping and crisis management efforts are generally open to third countries (whilst also preserving the EU’s decision-making autonomy). But the terms of participation in defence industrial projects have been drawn up to focus on ‘strategic autonomy’ and the development of EU military capacities, at the expense of cooperation with third countries like the UK.

Outside the European Economic Area, the scope for UK participation in the nearly €8 billion European Defence Fund and the new European Defence Industrial Strategy appears to be limited. This said, given that the UK’s large defence industrial sector operates cross-border within and beyond the EU, it could be impacted negatively by a further deepening of EU policy in this area as its companies are all but excluded from participation.

There is, of course, no certainty that the EU will realise of all its ambitions for defence. But it has already taken remarkable steps such as funding the provision of artillery shells for Ukraine and now providing the resources to industry to build a greater capacity to manufacture these in significant volume in the coming years.

Consequently, it would not be sensible for the UK to discount a greater role for the EU within the European defence and security system, especially in the evolution of defence technologies, defence procurement, and the structure of the European defence industry.

Although it is compelling to suggest that Russia’s war on Ukraine acted as a spur for closer UK-EU cooperation on foreign, security, and defence policy, this does not automatically translate into a ready-made guarantee of extensive future cooperation. This is especially the case because the EU is already building a model of cooperation between its members on defence which does not operate on the basis that third countries, such as the UK, can participate on a basis that allows for its views to be actively considered.

Further, the EU’s rapid defence policy development is also being developed on the assumption that America’s future contribution to European security will shrink.

The UK needs to be prepared for a possible reality in which the EU may be a more significant player in European defence and security. This means adopting a stance looking for where UK-EU cooperation in security and defence can be built for mutual benefit as insurance against a future in which America does not play a leading role in European security.

This analysis was first published by ConservativeHome.